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"NO POLITICAL TRUTH:" THE FEDERALIST AND
JUSTICE SCALIA ON THE SEPARATION OF POWERS

Price Marshall*
One of the principal objections inculcated by the more respectable
adversaries to the constitution, is its supposed violation of the
political maxim that the legislative, executive and judicial departments ought to be seperate and distinct .... No political truth is
certainly of greater intrinsic value or stamped with the authority of
more enlightened patrons of liberty than that on which the objection is founded ....

I persuade myself however, that it will be

made apparent to every one, that the charge cannot be supported,
and that the maxim on which it relies, has been totally misconceived and misapplied.
THE FEDERALIST No. 47
(J. Madison)
In the United States the separation of powers is an article of constitutional faith. Usually invoked in the same breath with checks and
balances, the constitutional principle of separation is part of the familiar American answer to the historic instability of popular government.
To layman and lawyer the values of separation are beyond debate; the
*

Law clerk to the Hon. Richard S. Arnold, Circuit Judge, United States Court of Ap-

peals for the Eighth Circuit; B.A. Arkansas State University 1985; M.Sc. London School of
Economics and Political Science 1986; J.D. Harvard Law School 1989. This essay grew out of
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constitutional theory).
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principle guarantees the very structural integrity necessary to commence and continue political debate.
The familiar, however, often becomes the unexamined. There is
a deluge of scholarly works on the separation of powers, covering
everything from its lineage' to its current usefulness.2 There are not,
however, many examinations of the principle's enduring constitutional meaning. 3 Indeed, by the lights of some scholars, the principle
has no constitutional meaning in the American context. On this view,
rather than a separation of powers, our Constitution merely established "a government of separated institutions sharing powers." 4 Testament to the growing influence of this more recent interpretation is
the brace of United States Supreme Court decisions, Morrison v. Olson 5 and Mistretta v. United States,6 that have recently, and almost
unanimously, worked a quiet revolution in the jurisprudence of
separation.
However, the definitional core of separation of powers, its reflective insights about our Constitution and ourselves, still wants exploration. My question is this: What is revealed about the Constitution
and its citizens by the way one approaches and analyzes separation of
powers issues? The question points up my emphasis. I am concerned
with the answers to particular separation of powers cases only insofar
as they instruct regarding the answerer's more general conception of
the principle. In this essay I shall make a start at responding to my
question by examining and comparing the separation of powers juris1. See, e.g., J. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (1967);
W. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (1965); Wright, The Origins of
Separation of Powers in America, 13 ECONOMICA 169 (1933).
2. See, e.g., SEPARATION OF POWERS: DOES IT STILL WORK? (W. Goldwin & A. Kaufman eds. 1986); Carey, Separationof Powers and the MadisonianModelk A Reply to the Critics,
72 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 151 (1978); Symposium, The American Constitutional Tradition of
Shared and Separated Powers, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 209 (1989); Symposium, Separation
of Powers and the Executive Branch: the Reagan Era in Retrospect, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
401 (1989).
3. But see Kurland, The Rise and Fall of the "Doctrine" of Separation of Powers, 85
MICH. L. REV. 592 (1986) (a fine and timely work that is the notable exception in exploring
the larger meaning of our separation of powers) and Krent, Separatingthe Strands in Separation of Powers Controversies, 74 VA. L. REV. 1253 (1988) (arguing that the debate between
"formalist" and "functionalist" theories of sepearation of powers is largely misconceived, and
calling for renewed attention to how the Constitution prescribes how and when each branch
can act).
4. R. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER 26 (2d ed. 1980).

5. 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988) (upholding the constitutionality of the independent counsel
provisions of the Ethics In Government Act).
6. 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989) (upholding the constitutionality of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and the Commission that promulgated them).
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prudence of two important parties to our constitutional conversation:
James Madison and Antonin Scalia.7 More particularly, I shall contrast Publius' way of thinking about separation of powers in THE
FEDERALIST,' numbers 47-51, with Justice Scalia's way of thinking
about separation of powers in Morrison and Mistretta.
I conclude that the Madisonian Publius and Justice Scalia share
a strong affinity in their approach to the separation of powers. Ironically, the Publian ancestor is invoked by all sides in the separation
debate. In Justice Scalia, though, we have a direct descendant in
premise, method, and purpose. Regarding premises, Publius and
Scalia agree: man has an imperfect nature that reveals itself nowhere
so clearly as in the tendency of human governments toward corruption and oppression. Regarding method, the two men disagree, but
only superficially. Publius appears to think about the separation of
powers in a much more flexible way than does Justice Scalia. When
one attends, however, to their different roles (the Constitution's
champion and the Constitution's judge), their respective methods of
conceptualizing separation questions converge. Regarding purposes,
an important difference of emphasis exists between the two men. For
Publius, the separation maxim's value flows from its promotion of liberty under free government. For Justice Scalia the maxim's value inheres in its linkage to the rule of law. These two ways of expressing
7. My effort is partial in at least two respects. First, I consider only a slice of each
individual's evolving view of the separation principle. See, e.g., II M. FARRAND, THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 74 (1966) (delegate Madison's speech of
July 21 urging an even greater sharing of powers between the executive and judicial branches
in a "Council of Revision" for all congressional actions); Scalia, The Doctrine ofStanding as an
Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, XVII SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 881 (1983) (Circuit
Judge Scalia urging "that the judicial doctrine of standing is a crucial and inseparable element" of the separation of powers). Secondly, I consider only the views of these two individuals, but the relevant constitutional conversation extends between hundreds of people over the
past two centuries.
8. THE FEDERALIST is the most famous group of essays generated by the debate over
ratification of the U.S. Constitution. The New York state ratification convention occasioned
this series of newspaper articles. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay each
wrote some of the 85 essays supporting the proposed Constitution, though Hamilton penned
the vast majority. All of the essays were published anonymously under the collective pseudonym "Publius"-Latin for "the citizen." Madison, however, wrote all five essays dealing with
the separation of powers. Madison, then, is Publius for purposes of explicating Publius' version of the separation of powers. Though aimed at the New York audience, the essays were
widely reprinted throughout the thirteen states. Probably because of its comprehensiveness
and the later political success of its authors, THE FEDERALIST has largely eclipsed other contemporary writings as the authoritative exposition of the most influential founders' views of the
Constitution. D. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST (1984) does an
admirably thorough job on the whole of Publius' political philosophy. His helpful treatment of
separation of powers is at pages 126-47.
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similar notions further illustrate the felt difference in roles between
the Constitution's advocate and a judge under that supreme law.
Notwithstanding this difference of focus, Justice Scalia emerges as the
rightful heir of the Publian approach to the separation of powers.
Now comes the obvious question: Given its impressive intellectual pedigree, why is Justice Scalia alone in dissent espousing this approach to the separation and equilibration of powers? I sense that the
answer lies in the substance and tendency of the unwritten changes to
our Constitution since the New Deal.9 In a world of "constitutional
politics" and "transformative appointments," considering separation
and balancing questions as settled is at best anachronistic and at worst
wrongheaded.' 0 In this new constitutional world the Court's role is as
a latter day counsel of censors, obliged to sit in periodic judgement of
legislatively generated and popularly unrejected constitutional modifications. This approach to separation of powers reflects a differentmore flexible and efficiency directed-Constitution, and a differentmore impatient and unengaged--citizenry. It is a conception of Constitution and citizenry as foreign to Publius and as unacceptable to
Justice Scalia, as is the approach to the separation of powers it entails.
This essay has two parts. Part I sketches Publius' and Justice
Scalia's respective answers to the particular separation questions that
confronted them. Part II compares and contrasts their two approaches to separation of powers. By "approach" I mean an individual's general conception of separate and balanced powers. That
conception can be located in the premises, method, and purposes revealed in answering separation questions. This second part of the essay attempts to isolate approach by splitting it into these three
(tentative) constituent parts: premises, method, and purposes. Some
brief explanatory remarks round out the essay.
I.
The initial task is to sketch the particular answers given by Pub9. See Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter The New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 422-25
(1987) (exploring the implications of the structural changes to our Constitution effected by
New Deal legislation and subsequent Supreme Court jurisprudence).
10. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013,
1024 (1984) (developing a theory of constitutionalism and judicial review that accounts for
constitutional changes occurring through "constitutional" rather than ordinary politics but
without formal constitutional amendments); Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1164, 1165-67 (1988) (explaining the failed nomination of Judge Robert Bork
to the U.S. Supreme Court in terms of a failure of popular support for potentially radical
constitutional changes, such as those eventually carried out with popular support [manifest
through "constitutional politics"] by President Franklin Roosevelt's Court appointees).
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lius and Justice Scalia when faced with a challenge to the meaning of
separation of powers. This is not so much to evaluate these answers
as to make a first step toward the respective approaches of the two
men. This is a proper place to begin, because, to paraphrase Justice
Cardozo, their answers are instinct with those approaches. I shall
first consider Madison's essays and then Justice Scalia's dissents.
Where possible, each individual shall speak for himself.
Madison, writing in numbers 47-51 of THE FEDERALIST, confronts and wrestles with the separation of powers. He there undertakes two particular tasks. First, he responds to the charge leveled by
"the more respectable adversaries to the constitution" that the document violated "the political maxim" that the three "departments
ought to be separate and distinct."" Second, he defends the Constitution's "mixture of powers" as the best means of preserving the separation of power required for the enjoyment of political liberty. (47, 324)
In Madison's response and defense lies the Publian approach to the
separation of powers.
The argument of the essays comes in three parts. The first part is
Madison's defense of the Constitution's fidelity to the separation of
powers; it takes the whole of number 47. He relies there on both
theory and American practice. Madison interprets Montesquieu's
maxim of separation only to forbid that "the whole power of one department . . . [be] exercised by the same hands which possess the
whole power of another department." The "political apothegm" does
not "mean that these departments ought to have no partialagency in,
or controul over the acts of each other." (47, 325-26) (emphasis in
original) Madison also surveys the state constitutions adopted during
and after the American revolution. Those documents, without exception, make the case that the three departments "have not been kept
totally separate and distinct." (47, 331) He concludes that neither the
theory nor the American practice of separation of powers warrants
charging the proposed federal Constitution with infidelity to the separation maxim.
The second part of this argument considers alternative ways to
maintain and enforce the separation of powers. Madison examines
and rejects three proposals in turn: mere "parchment barriers" (48,
333), "occasional appeals" to the people assembled in constitutional
conventions (49, 343), and "periodical," that is regularly scheduled,
11. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 323 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). All citations are
to the Cooke edition. The essay number and page number in that edition will hereafter be
noted in the text after each quotation in lieu of further footnoting.
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appeals to some more enlightened part of the people. (50, 344) (emphasis in original) He finds each of these methods wanting. During
and after the revolution, parchment barriers failed to restrain the "enterprising ambition" of the state legislatures. (48, 334) Further, any
kind of appeal to the people will ultimately be ineffective. Faction
will result. Passion rather than reason will "sit in judgment." (49,
343) Therefore, Madison concluded, some other way must be found
to maintain "the constitutional equilibrium" of separated powers necessary for liberty. (49, 341)
Madison defends the Constitution's solution to "the great problem" of maintaining separation in the third and final part of his argument. (48, 332) The solution comprises all of FEDERALIST 51,
rightly counted among the best of all the essays. There Madison explains that the separation of powers can only be maintained by "supplying ...

the defect of better motives" with the "opposite and rival

interests" of the constitutional place. (51, 349) Through structural
counterpoise, individual "[a]mbition must be made to counteract ambition." (51, 349) Only thus can the constitutional rights of the three
departments be adequately policed. (51, 349) Giving the executive
branch a share of the legislative power through a conditional negative,
and dividing power among two levels of government (possible only in
the "compound republic" of America), are Madison's two examples
of this tense power-sharing. (51, 351) His point is clear; in a "government which is to be administered by men over men," enduring separation of powers requires jealous sharing of powers. (51, 349)
The last two terms of the United States Supreme Court have
brought two decisions regarding the "constitutional principle of separation of powers." 2 Justice Scalia has been a Jeremiah to the Court's
Israel, stridently dissenting alone in both cases. His approach to separation of powers jurisprudence emerges from those dissents. As with
Publius, it is best to begin our investigation by outlining the structure
and focus of Justice Scalia's particular answers to the separation questions he faced.
Morrison was a challenge to the Independent Counsel provisions
of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (EIG Act).' 3 Theodore Olson (a former executive branch official under investigation by an Independent Counsel) challenged the appointment, supervision, and
removal provisions of the EIG Act as unconstitutional violations of
the Executive's appointment and removal powers. Olson also chal12. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2602; Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 678.
13. 28 U.S.C. § 49 (1982).
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lenged these provisions as unconstitutional compromises of the separation of powers. The Court, by a vote of seven to one, upheld the
EIG Act against each of these challenges. Justice Scalia dissented.
Mistretta was a challenge to the United States Sentencing Commission established under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SR
Act). 4 John Mistretta was sentenced under the sentencing guidelines
promulgated by the Commission. He challenged his sentence by challenging the constitutionality of the Sentencing Commission. He urged
that the power to set the guidelines was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power and that the membership and location of the
Commission in the judicial branch violated the separation of powers.
The Court, by a vote of eight to one, rejected both challenges. Justice
Scalia dissented.
In Morrison and Mistretta Scalia rejected the majority's substantive analysis and decisional method. He conceptualized each case as,
first and foremost, a dangerous compromise of our basic governmental structure. The Independent Counsel was "a mini-executive," the
Sentencing Commission a "sort-of junior varsity Congress."' 5 Regarding the Independent Counsel, Scalia saw it as the paradigm case
of legislative trespassing on the traditionally executive prosecutorial
field. Regarding the Sentencing Commission, he saw a more novel
result-legislative abandonment of their own field to members of the
other branches. In each case, however, Justice Scalia proclaimed the
same general problem: the accountability of government evaporated
as the Court "encumber[ed] the Republic" by condoning transient
legislative fiddling with the basic structure. 6
Apart from his substantive disagreements, Justice Scalia also
quarreled with the Court's method of considering these separation
questions. The Court's majority "ha[d] it backwards" by focusing
first on doctrinal technicalities and only then on the separation of
powers principles that inform those doctrines.' 7 "Worse than what
[the Court] has done, however, is the manner in which it has done it
....
It extends into the very heart of our most significant constitutional function the 'totality of the circumstances' mode of analysis
that this Court has in recent years become fond of ....
This is not
analysis; it is ad hoc judgment."'
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

18 U.S.C. § 3551 (1982), amended by 28 U.S.C. § 991 (1984).
Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2640; Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 682.
Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2640; Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 682.
Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2625.
Id. at 2640-41.
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Rather than a case by case judicial judgment regarding how
much encroachment upon, or sharing of, powers is "too much," Justice Scalia offered the discipline and predictability of principles.19 In
Morrison the Court should have attended to our basic document. The
Constitution provides that "all executive powers are the President's."2 ° The implied corollary is that any legislative or judicial encroachment upon those powers is constitutionally impermissible. In
Mistretta the "Constitution's structural restrictions that deter excessive delegation" require that "the power to make law cannot be exercised by anyone other than Congress, except in conjunction with the
lawful exercise of executive or of judicial power."'" According to Justice Scalia, structural rigor is infinitely preferable to the vagaries of
balancing tests for maintaining our separation of powers.22
II.
What distinguishes the approaches of Publius and Justice Scalia
from one another? More broadly, what is it that we can discern about
the separation of powers by examining their respective approaches to
the celebrated maxim? I sense a great deal of insight lurking in the
consonance and dissonance between their two views. It is time to test
that sense by comparing and contrasting their respective approaches.
That is best done along the three axes comprising a conception of
separation of powers-premises, method, and purpose; what I have
termed, taken as a whole, as "approach." Again, this admittedly tentative scheme is useful only to focus attention on the constituent parts
of the cluster of notions that is separation of powers.
A.

Premises
Madison and Justice Scalia share realistic assumptions about individuals and about the governments peopled by those individuals.
These are the common grounds for their separate approaches to separation of powers. Publius is the more explicit in his acceptance of the
unchanging human nature that leavens his zeal for popular self-government.23 Men are moved no less by "prejudices" than by reason, to
support their government. (49, 340) His friend Jefferson's suggestion
19. Id. (emphasis in original).
20. Id. at 2628 (emphasis in original).
21. Mistretta, 109 S.Ct. at 678.
22. Morrison, 108 S.Ct. at 2636-37; Mistretta, 109 S.Ct. at 682.
23. Wright, THE FEDERALIST On the Nature of PoliticalMan, LIX ETHICS 1 (1949) (the
seminal interpretation of THE FEDERALIST'S realistic view of human nature); see also, EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 193.
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of appeals to the people in constitutional convention as the proper
medicine for the encroaching branches problem was, therefore, misguided. Not only would these conventions sap the prejudice-driven
veneration for the Constitution, they would give rein to unrefined
popular feelings. "The passions . . . not the reason, of the public,
would sit in judgement," robbing such deliberations of their effectiveness. (49, 343) (emphasis in original) The fact that we are men and
not angels creates the need for government in general, and the need
for a certain kind and structure of government in particular. "But
what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections of human
nature?" (51, 349)
If Justice Scalia doesn't spell out as explicitly as Madison his
view of human nature, he implies his views when describing the nature of our government. Government is about "Power." For Scalia,
"[t]hat is what [Morrison] is about." He chooses an evocative metaphor. The EIG Act is but the latest aggrandizing effort of the legislative "wolf"-the hungry and cunning beast seeking to satisfy a blood
lust it can neither control nor moderate. Whether "as a wolf ...[or]
in sheep's clothing," the wolf is nonetheless expected.2 4 Scalia's understanding of the congressional hunger to expand its influence
manifests itself in his constitutional predictions. In respect to the executive's newly limited removal power, it is now open season on the
executive officers of Congress' choice. "The possibilities are endless,
and the Court does not understand what the separation of powers,
what 'ambition... counteract[ing] ambition,' is all about if it does not
expect the Congress to try them."2 5 In respect to Congress' now unanchored delegation power, we can expect "all manner of 'expert'
bodies, insulated from the political process." These congressional
creatures will conveniently "dispose of... thorny and 'no-win' political issues," letting their masters escape democratic accountability.2 6
In each case the point is the same for Scalia; the Court has unleashed
the Congress by not appreciating the institutional appetite of the legislative branch.
As Justice Scalia's invocation of Publius suggests, Madison
would agree (in principle and based on revolutionary experience) that
the legislature needs restraining. "It will not be denied, that power is
of an encroaching nature, and that it ought to be effectually restrained
from passing the limits assigned to it." (48, 332) Because it ispopular
24. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2623.
25. Id. at 2637 (citation omitted).
26. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 680.
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government, "[iln republican government the legislative authority,
necessarily, predominates." (51, 350) If the people's representatives
are to represent them and their views, then the connection between
constituent and congressman allows and encourages popular support
of legislative endeavors. The legislative tendency toward aggrandizement of its powers is further fueled by the "enterprising ambition" of
the people's representatives. (48, 334)
This need to prevent the legislative department from "extending
the sphere of its activity and drawing all power into its impetuous
vortex" calls forth the "auxiliary precautions" of sharing powers to
keep power separated. (48, 333; 51, 349) Therein lies the Publian
defense of our Constitution's structural innovation: fortification of
the two other departments so that "by their mutual relations" all may
"be the means of keeping each other in their proper places." (51, 34738) It is a government made safe for non-angels-both governed and
governors alike-by its internal structure.
In sum, a great similarity of assumptions about the nature of
government appears in Madison's and Scalia's thoughts on separation
of powers. Moreover, if we can safely extract Scalia's understanding
of human nature from his views on government, then yet another similarity emerges in his and Madison's realistic assessment of political
action. Their premises for conceptualizing the separation principle
are thus remarkably close.
B.

Method

What method or way of discussing separation of powers have
Publius and Justice Scalia developed? Do they consider the principle
flexible or rigid? Why do they perceive (or not perceive) play in particular constitutional joints? These questions can be answered by
comparing the more general way in which each individual experiences
the restraints of separation of powers. The working hypothesis is that
for Madison the maxim is quite fluid, while for Justice Scalia it is
quite rigorous. This would explain Madison's alleged support-as

claimed by the Court's majority in relying on

FEDERALIST

47-for

the result in Morrison and Mistretta. I will test that tentative conclusion by explicating Publius' and Scalia's methods of dealing with the
separation of powers.
Madison's view of the principle of separation appears quite flexible. His interpretation of Montesquieu, based on early state constitu-
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tional practice, materially alters the maxim." He contracts the
principle of separation until there is almost nothing left of the "political truth." Consider his limiting condition, the total accumulation
standard. (47, 325-26) So long as no individual or group of individuals exercising the complete power of one branch exercises the complete
power of another branch, the maxim is not violated. On that standard
neither the Sentencing Commission nor the Independent Counsel
would violate the maxim as a matter of constitutional arrangement.
That is precisely the majority's point in deploying Madison's interpretation in each of these cases.
Madison does, however, note his hesitation with extreme forms
of power-sharing. After surveying state constitutional language and
practice, he admits that "in some instances, the fundamental principle
under consideration has been violated by too great a mixture." (47,
331) Further clarifying and limiting the total accumulation standard,
Madison argues that any mixture (even one short of a total accumulation) that deprives a department of "a will of its own" is too great.
(51, 348) However, if that amended standard is our only guide, then
the exact boundaries of the separation advocated by Madison remain
indistinct.
Madison's use of experience to discipline theory reinforces this
interpretation of Publian flexibility. One example is the argument just
developed: Madison's gloss on Montesquieu based upon "the sense in
which [separation of powers] has hitherto been understood in
America." (47, 331) Another is his rejection of the "parchment barriers" (48) and the periodic review of a "counsel of censors" (50) as a
means of maintaining that separation. "[E]xperience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions." (51, 349) (emphasis supplied) In each instance Madison makes thairetical progress by
relying on practical experiences.
Publius also neatly elides an exact definition of what constitutes
legislative, executive, or judicial power. Publius asks the right question, but never answers it. He notes that it is only "[a]fter discriminating therefore in theory, the several classes of power, as they may in
their nature be legislative, executive, or judiciary; [that] the next and
most difficult task, is to provide some practical security for each
against the invasion of the others." (48, 332) While Madison spends
27. Montesquieu's discussion of separation of powers, in Part IV, Book XII of THE
SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, is notoriously opaque. First, he did not develop a theory of separation,

he discussed the British constitution. Second, it is not clear he understood what he was attempting to discuss. See VILE, supra note 1, at 77-118.
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his time on "the next and most difficult task," we are left wondering
about the "nature" of each branch. (48, 332)
The only other mention of this definitional difficulty that I can

find in

THE FEDERALIST

appears amidst Madison's formidable de-

fense of federalism in essay 37. There he contends that the three departments, being the work of imperfect men, can probably never be
exactly defined.
Experience has instructed us that no skill in the science of Government has yet been able to discriminate and define, with sufficient
certainty, its three great provinces, the Legislative, Executive and
Judiciary; or even the privileges and powers of the different Legislative branches. Questions daily occur in the course of practice,
which prove the obscurity which reigns in these subjects, and
which puzzle the greatest adepts in political science. (37, 235)
Again yoking theory to experience, Madison implicitly affirms a flexible separation of powers through his understanding of each branch's
evanescent nature.
Measured against this Publian flexibility, Justice Scalia's way of
thinking about separation of powers seems inexplicably and unnecessarily rigid. A complete examination reveals otherwise. Appearances
do count for something, however, and making the case for Scalian
rigorism is a useful analytic beginning.
The Justice's conceptualization of both Morrison and Mistretta
bespeaks a rigid view of separation. In the former case, the hub of
Scalia's opinion is that the Constitution requires "all of the executive
power" to be "vested in a President of the United States." 2 8 Since the
Independent Counsel is neither the Chief Executive nor accountable
to him, it is an unconstitutional office. In the latter case, the congressional delegation of law-making power to a non-legislative branch
agency is the constitutional infirmity. "The only governmental power
the Commission possesses is the power to make law; and it is not the
Congress."2 9 The definitional grip of each branch's proper province
gives power, and rigidity, to Scalia's view of the separation principle.
At the same time, however, Scalia's method is not barren of flexibility. He, like Madison, admits to a certain fuzziness around the
edges of each branch's proper sphere. Speaking respectfully of the
precedential corpse-Humphrey's Executor 3 0 -at the Court's feet,
Scalia agrees that while the demarcation between "purely executive"
28. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2626 (emphasis in original).
29. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 680.
30. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (confining the President's
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and other officers has never been entirely clear, the line was nonetheless a useful landmark. 3' Likewise his understanding that delegation
inevitably involves law-making power. "The whole theory of lawful
congressional 'delegation' is . . .that a certain degree of discretion,

and thus of law-making, inheres in most executive or judicial action
....32 Behind both these insights lies an appreciation of measured
play within constitutional joints.
These hints of flexibility in Scalia's separation of powers thinking
make two important points. First, some flexibility exists in his view.
Scalia's notions of separation are not so closely tied to the constitutional text that they admit of no elasticity. Secondly, though, that
flexibility remains quite limited. Justice Scalia is only willing to travel
a short distance from the command of text. His position is well illustrated by both decisions under scrutiny. In Mistretta, after admitting
the looseness of delegation doctrine, Scalia uses this looseness as the
main reason why the courts "must be particularly rigorous in preserving the Constitution's structural restrictions that deter excessive delegation." ' 33 He admonishes that courts must strictly maintain the three
separate powers we already have, in the form we already have them.
In Morrison the rigidity of Scalia's method is even more telling.
After asserting that the executive power must extend to all executive
functions, Scalia asks the Court to consider a hypothetical: is it conceivable that if Congress passed a statute depriving itself of less than
"full and entire control" over some legislative area, the Court would
mince details over how important the area or how much control was
given? "Of course we would have none of that. Once we determined
that a purely legislative power was at issue we would require it to be
exercised, wholly and entirely, by Congress."' 34 Scalia just described
the then pending case of Mistretta v. United States, and he, not the
Court, was the only one whose method of addressing separation of
powers questions was rigorous enough to "require" the Congress to
promulgate the sentencing guidelines.
Even though Madison and Scalia seem to differ in the flexibility
of their respective methods, they agree on the uses of experience. Like
Publius, Justice Scalia marshals history to his argumentative cause.
When faced with the difficulty of locating the nature of the Independremoval power to "purely executive" officers and allowing the Congress some latitude in
prohibiting the removal of other executive officers).
31. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2636-37.
32. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 678 (emphasis in original).
33. Id.
34. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2628.
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ent Counsel's office in a particular branch, Scalia looks to
prosecutorial history. He agrees with the majority's conclusion that
prosecution is "typically" an executive function, but he goes further.
For Scalia, history demonstrates that prosecution is always an executive function.35 When faced with the similar problem of responding
to Congress' placement of the Sentencing Commission in the judicial
branch, Justice Scalia turned to function only upon finding no history
that informs the question. "It would seem logical to decide the question of which Branch
an agency belongs to on the basis of who con36
trols its actions."
Scalia's attention to "who controls" is but another manifestation
of his recognition of the realities of politics as revealed through history. The same insight was revealed in his acceptance of Madisonian
premises regarding inter-branch relations. His characterization of the
facts in Morrison makes the point again: "the Legislative and the Executive Branches became embroiled in a dispute concerning the scope
of the congressional investigatory power, which-as is often the case
with such inter-branch conflicts-became quite acrimonious. '"" For
Justice Scalia, experience teaches. We should expect such conflicts
and allow them to work as structural safeguards for our Constitution
rather than seeking their solution.
Given the similarity between Publius' and Justice Scalia's argumentative premises and their use of experience, it seems proper to
seek a reconciliation of their diverging methods of thinking about separation of powers. Put more pointedly, is there any way to reconcile
Publian flexibility and Scalian rigidity? One possible road of reconciliation lies in a greater attention to role. Publius is an advocate for the
Constitution; his office is persuasion. Justice Scalia is just that: a Justice of the Supreme Court created, empowered, and bounded by the
Constitution Publius championed. Scalia's charge is to uphold the
Constitution under which he lives and serves. The difference is one of
place; where each man sits colors his method of discussing and thinking about the separation of powers.
Justice Scalia hints at his appreciation of this difference in role in
Mistretta. He laments the majority's dependence on Madison's arguments. Publius' interpretation of Montesquieu, allowing shared as
well as separate powers, was only to defend "the commingling specifically provided for in the structure that he and his colleagues had
35. Id. at 2626.
36. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 681.
37. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2623 (citations and quotations omitted).
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designed." Wholesale judicial revisions of the structure allowing increased commingling are therefore out of constitutional bounds.
"[T]he framers themselves considered how much commingling was, in
the generality of things, acceptable, and set forth their conclusions in
the document." According to Justice Scalia, Madison "would be
aghast to hear" his interpretation of Montesquieu "used as justification for ignoring that carefully designed structure so long as, in the
changing view of the Supreme Court from time to time, 'too much
commingling' does not occur. "38 While there may be enough flexibility in the system for the Court to pass on commingling at the "margins," when "the outline of the framework" is in question, then for
Justice Scalia the issue is clear-cut: the Court's obligation is to enforce the existing framework.3 9 To do otherwise is to mistake the judicial role for that of the advocate, or worse, for that of the framer.
This role-based reconciliation is also supported by Representative
Madison's actions in the first United States Congress. One provision
contained in the package of proposed conciliatory amendments to the
newly ratified federal Constitution-suggestions that Madison edited,
introduced, and shepherded through the House of Representativeswas a statement regarding the separation of powers. The clause did
not proclaim in the manner of many early state constitutions that the
celebrated maxim of separated powers was inviolable. Rather,
Madison's proposal required that "the powers delegated by this Constitution, are appropriated to the departments to which they are respectively delegated." The House approved this provision without
alteration. The Senate, however, omitted the clause without explanation from the list of amendments ultimately forwarded to the several
states. Madison's proposal is noteworthy. His suggested amendment
would have further solidified the existing constitutional arrangement
rather than inviting later structural rearrangement.'
To conclude, our working hypothesis-that a substantial difference in method exists between Publius and Justice Scalia regarding
the separation of powers-must give way to a more nuanced understanding. First, they share at least some similarity in method because
both of their ways of thinking about separation rely heavily on experience. Second, and more importantly, the dissonance between their
38. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 683 (emphasis supplied).
39. Id.
40. See XII THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 202 (W. Hutchinson ed. 1979) (listing the
amendments proposed by Madison in his June 1789 speech to the House of Representatives);
W. SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND:
RIGHTS

A

HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BILL OF

181-91 (1977) (elaborating the congressional debates over the proposed amendments).
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two views-between Publian flexibility and Scalian rigidity-fades in
the face of a heightened awareness of their roles. Justice Scalia rightly
feels confined within the structure erected by Madison and the other
framers, and accepted by the ratifiers. Were Publius to go on the
Court, I conjecture that his method of thinking about the separation
of powers would harden, just as Representative Madison's views did.
If my speculation is correct, then as with their premises, Madison's
and Scalia's ways of conceptualizing the separation of powers converges. We can better assay the differences that remain between the
two men by a closer look at the purposes each of them sees as served
by the separation maxim.
C.

Purposes

Publius and Justice Scalia emphasize different values served by
separated and shared powers. For Publius the "sacred maxim of free
government" is instrumental in providing free government and the
"preservation of liberty" that goes along with that system. (47, 331,
324) If the separation fails and all governmental power begins to accumulate in a single branch, then "the very definition of tyranny"
awaits the citizenry. (47, 324) The failure of previous constitutional
efforts to maintain the necessary separation occasioned the federal
Constitution's "auxiliary precautions." (51, 349) The three departments must be separated, and "so far connected and blended, as to
give each a constitutional controul over the others," in order that "the
degree of separation the maxim requires as essential to a free government" may be "duly maintained." (48, 332) According to Publius,
"[j]ustice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It
ever has been, and ever will be pursued, until it be obtained, or until
liberty be lost in the pursuit." (51, 352) The separation and sharing
of powers is simply another human attempt to that end.
Justice Scalia's approach to separation questions does not emphasize justice, liberty, or even free government. Rather, the "rule of
law," providing just government and meaningful rights in its train,
animates his separation of powers decisions. By the "rule of law," I
take Scalia to mean the Anglo-American law-making tradition of
political fidelity to general substantive rules and to regular procedures
in generating and applying those rules.4 1 This is by no means uncon41. See Shklar, Political Theory and the Rule of Law and Weinrib, The Intelligibilityof the

Rule of Law, in

THE RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY

(A. Hutchinson and P. Monahan

eds. 1987) for two recent essays that attempt a clarification of this important but amorphous
notion.
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nected to the values Publius sees in the maxim; indeed it is substantively quite similar. But the difference in emphasis reveals Scalia's
larger concerns and therefore is worth exploring.
Scalia opens his dissent in Morrison quoting the thirtieth article
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. This provision codifies a
version of the separation maxim, but with a distinctive concluding
explanation: the powers of the government are to be separated "to the
end that it may be a government of laws, and not of men.' '42 This is
the "proud boast of our democracy. '4 3 The rule of law is the benchmark for Scalia's two dissents. The rule of law requires accountability. Accountability guarantees the people's right to judge their
magistrates and either re-elect them or throw the rascals out. The
"mini-executive" Independent Counsel is a constitutionally impermissible solution because it eliminates this accountability." The Substance of the Congress' delegation of law-making power to the
Sentencing Commission is also constitutionally untenable because it
too violates this principle. The Congress' grant exceeds-by abdicating-the powers delegated to the Legislature by the people. Relinquishing legislative responsibility is the definition of lawlessness.4 5
Scalia is also firm in regard to the Court's ad hoc, "totality of the
circumstances" method of deciding separation questions. "A government of laws means a government of rules. Today's decision on the
fragmentation of executive power is ungoverned by rule, and hence
ungoverned by law."4 6
Scalia's focus on the connection between the separation of powers and the rule of law indicates his larger concerns about constitutional adjudication. His recent call for a return to "The Rule of Law
as a Law of Rules" is presaged by his vision of the purposes served by
the separation of powers.4 7 His ponderings about the nature of his
judicial office are yet another indication how distant, both in time and
42. MASS. CONST., Dec. of Rights, art. XXX (1780). Scalia slips a bit in his historical
explanation that this document is the source of the phrase. See Michelman, Foreward: Traces
of Self Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986) (tracing the thought from the writings of
English oppositionist James Harrington through John Adams and John Marshall into late
seventeenth century American argument). History aside, Scalia's point regarding the continuing influence of the notion is well taken.
43. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2622.
44. Id. at 2638-39.
45. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 679.
46. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2640-41.
47. Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Ci. L. REV. 1175 (1989) (address
by Justice Antonin Scalia, The 1989 Oliver Wendell Holmes Memorial Lecture at The
Harvard Law School (February 14, 1989)).
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in place, he feels from our Constitution's framing. Scalia does, however, acknowledge and accept Publius' understandings of separation.
It is the principle of empowering each branch to resist the others, the
sharing of powers, that "gives comprehensible content to the appointments clause, and determines the appropriate scope of the removal
power. "48 Further, one of the purposes of the separation of powers is
to "ensure that we do not lose liberty" in our hastening after governmental efficiency. While endorsing these Publian insights, however,
Justice Scalia contextualizes his approach to the separation. The best
fence against a government of men is a "secure structure of separated
powers." 4 9 And by Scalia's estimation, only judges are around to
mind those fences. This peculiarly judicial obligation accounts for his
focus on the rule of law values of the separation of powers.
Our effort to reconcile Publius' and Justice Scalia's different purposive emphases regarding the separation principle has led us again to
their different roles. As the advocate, Publius can be more concerned
with popular and general values, such as liberty, justice, and free government. As the judge, Scalia must stay closer to the ground. The
everyday tools of judging-rules and laws-such is the stuff that the
value of separation of powers is made on for the judicial craftsman.
Our examination of the apparent dissimilarity between Publius'
and Justice Scalia's approach to separation of powers has revealed a
substantial similarity in their respective conceptions. Regarding
premises they agree: man has an imperfect nature and his tendency in
government is to overstep prescribed bounds. The seeming distance
between Publius' flexible method of thinking about separation of powers and Justice Scalia's correspondingly rigid method contracts when
one considers their respective roles. The variance between their different emphases on the value and purpose of separation is at once
compatible and illustrative. The explanation is once again one of role.
The distance between maintaining liberty and guaranteeing the rule of
law is precisely the difference between the advocate and the judge;
both purposes are variations on the same theme of maintaining free
government.
If Justice Scalia's understanding of the separation of powers is
Madisonian, then why is he dissenting alone in Morrison and Mistretta? The question implies originalism, but that is not my intention.
48. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2625.
49. Id. at 2629.
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In a sense we are all originalists when it comes to these cases. Even
the majority in both Morrison and Mistretta unabashedly relied on
what they took to be the true Madisonian approach to separation.
More precisely, the question is: given their error as a matter of history and interpretation, how is it that the non-Madisonian, elastic approach to separation of powers now commands the Court?
The explanation lies in the combustion of two elements: the impure separation of powers that characterizes our system and the
changed notion of what our Constitution is. To maintain constitutional equilibrium, the framers created an unstable mixture: powers
were shared in order to be kept separated. The novelty of the innovation has finally overtaken the polity. The fact is that we have as much
checking and balancing as we do separation. The expansion of the
former is by definition the contraction of the latter. The framing innovation pointed the way toward, if not set in motion, even greater
commingling. Still within the supposed bounds of the celebrated
maxim, more sharing was the logical response to current, but currently insoluble, problems. The instances that come immediately to
mind are the creation of the modem administrative state during the
New Deal and the expansion of that bureaucracy during the push for
a Great Society. The Independent Counsel and the Sentencing Commission are merely the latest examples of the trend.
The second factor that explains Scalia's separation of powers
vigil is, as Professors Ackerman 5" and Sunstein 5 t suggest, that these
and other changes to our Constitution have been effected without formal amendments. This severalty of changes to our constitutional
structure-the New Deal and its commerce clause jurisprudence, the
Warren Court's federalization and expansion of individual rights and
the erosion of state sovereignty-have all occurred without taking the
"constitutional road to the decision of the people" mapped out in Article V. (49, 339) If politics can be constitutional and appointments
transformative, then it is no longer constitutionally credible to stay
within the document when judging structural innovations.
Publius' and Justice Scalia's respective approaches to the separation of powers, and to the Constitution embodying those powers, are
remarkably similar. The Court, and perhaps the nation, on the other
hand, currently have a different conception of the separation of powers and a new constitution embodying that vision. The irony of these
transformations looms. Had there been any political truth left in the
50. Ackerman, supra note 10.
51. Sunstein, supra note 9.

264

UALR LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 12:245

celebrated maxim after the American founding, this new principle of
separation and its constitution could not have taken root. The very
success of the general Madisonian solution has eroded the particular
Madisonian structure.

